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IS THE MILITARY BRIG A DEBTORS' PRISON?
Captain C. H. Morrison, Jr.*
In this Article, CaptainMorrison examines the treatment accorded debtors in the armed forces. The authorsuggests that the
militaryjustice system is compelled to balance various interests
when dealing with a serviceman-debtor. Order and discipline
within the defense establishment must be preserved and the
legitimate interests of creditors must be protected. At the same
time, the military is aware that the debtor is often in need of
assistance and advice in handling burdensome financial
matters. It is therefore not surprising that in its attempt to
harmonize these competing interests the military has limited
the use of court-martial and imprisonment and expanded the
protections and assistance afforded the military debtor.

There is no disguising the fact that Mr. Pickwick felt very lowspirited and uncomfortable; not for lack of society, for the prison
was very full,. . . but he was alone in the coarse vulgar crowd,
and felt the depression of spirit and sinking of heart, naturally
cQnsequent on the reflection that he was cooped and caged up,
without a prospect of liberation. Dickens, The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club 619 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1932).
The term "debtor's prison" evokes faint images from the past
of entire families living in squalid cells, cold, oppressed and hungry, waiting anxiously for release from the tight grip of their creditors.' While most people assume that such prisons no longer
exist,' military critics insist that the United States Armed Forces
United States Marine Corps Judge Advocate. J.D. DePaul University College of Law.
1. For an interesting fictional account of the treatment of debtors in eighteenth and
nineteenth century England, see C. DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS (1838).
2. Contrary to popular belief, many debtors were imprisoned in the early history of the
country. Not until the 1830's did imprisonment for debt become statutorily and constitutionally restricted by almost all of the states. See Comment, Imprisonment for Debt
and the Constitution,1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 659. A brief history of imprisonment for debt
in the United States is found in P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS INAMERICA ch. 18
*
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still imprisons debtors.3 They also maintain that this military
custom runs counter to an American tradition which properly
abhors incarceration for mere mismanagement of one's financial
affairs. However, these critics are wrong on both counts.
While a serviceman4 may be imprisoned for conduct related to
his debt,' simple failure to repay a financial obligation is insufficient cause for imposition of this serious penalty. The military
requires that the conduct be so reprehensible as to border upon
fraud before imprisonment will be justified. In fact, a civilian who
engages in similar conduct may incur the same punishment in the
nonmilitary sector.
This Article will examine the treatment of military debtors on
both a theoretical and practical level. The legal parameters of the
military offense of dishonorable failure to pay debts will be analyzed and the special problems arising from concurrent civilian
and military authority over the serviceman will be discussed. In
addition, various regulations, current statistics, and interviews
with senior military officials will be used to illustrate the prevailing practices which affect the military debtor.
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IN THE MILITARY

Military critics charge the armed forces with imposing harsh
sanctions upon military personnel who mismanage their debts.
However, the Uniform Code of Military Justice6 clearly limits
(1974). See notes 43 & 44 infra for contemporary state constitutional and statutory provisions regarding imprisonment for debt.
3. See Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679
(1971). For criticisms of Article 134, under which servicemen are court-martialed for
dishonorable failure to pay debt, see Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness, 37 N. CAR. L. REv. 142 (1959); Comment, The Unrestricted
Anachronism, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 821 (1971).
4. For purposes of this Article, the word "serviceman" and other words of the masculine
gender include the feminine gender.
5. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 127c (rev. ed. 1969) (Table of
Maximum Punishments) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. The MANUAL is a detailed set of
regulations which supplements and explains provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. The present MANUAL was promulgated by Executive Order No. 11476 on June 19,
1969.
6. UCMJ arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. §§801-940 (1970). This codification of military law is
applicable to all the Armed Services. Articles in the Code may be found in 10 U.S.C. by
adding 800 to the numbered article. For example, Article 125 is 10 U.S.C. §925 (1970).
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imprisonment of military debtors to instances where the serviceman is guilty of fraudulent conduct. When one considers the important rationale for imposition of the sanction, plus the requirement of fraudulent conduct, the criticism appears unjustified.
Under Article 134 of the Code, servicemen are subject to courtmartial and imprisonment for conduct which "prejudice[s]
good order and discipline" or "bring[s] discredit upon the armed
forces."' Discrediting conduct is defined as "conduct which has
a tendency to bring the service into disrepute or which tends to
lower it in public esteem". 8 When a serviceman's actions in
handling his debts constitute discrediting conduct, he can be
court-martialed under Article 134 for dishonorable failure to pay
debts.
The rationale underlying this offense is the unique nature of the
military. The armed forces are given the special responsibility to
"fight or be ready to fight wars" 9 and therefore order within the
7. UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. §934 (1970). Article 134, the General Article, provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in the chapter, all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that
court.
The MANUAL, which has been called the Code's "junior relative," United States v.
Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 544, 20 C.M.R. 254, 260 (1955), says:
Article 134 makes punishable all acts not specifically proscribed in any other
article of the code when they amount to disorders or neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the armed forces or to conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, or constitute non-capital crimes or offenses
denounced by enactment of Congress or under authority of Congress.
MANUAL
213a.
The Supreme Court, responding to an appeal alleging vagueness, has held that both
Article 134 and Article 133 are constitutionally valid. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974);
accord, Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
8. MANUAL 213c. The MANUAL lists offenses which are violations of Article 134: assaults involving intent to commit certain offenses of a civil nature; indecent assault;
indecent acts with a child under the age of 16 years; false swearing; disloyal statements
undermining discipline and loyalty; misprision of a felony; bigamy; communicating a
threat; use or possession of false and unauthorized passes, permits, discharge certifications, and identification cards; negligent homocide; offenses against correctional custody;
receiving stolen property; dishonorable failure to maintain funds for payment of checks;
and dishonorable failure to pay debts. See MANUAL 213f.
9. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
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military is of extreme importance. Disputes over debts between
servicemen weaken discipline within the ranks l " and may endanger the effectiveness of troops in combat. Moreover, the defense
establishment must retain a good reputation within the civilian
sector. A respectable image is necessary to recruiting and retention of armed forces, to fostering general public support," and to
insuring the extension of credit to other servicemen. 2 The failure
of servicemen to honor debts owed to civilian creditors hampers
the attainment of these goals. In addition, the transiency of the
military populace creates special problems in insuring that debts
are honored. 3 The difficulty of effecting civil process on a mobile
debtor requires that servicemen be encouraged to make timely
repayment of debts. A high standard of conduct and the threat
of court-martial are strong inducements. 4
Charges against a commissioned officer-debtor for dishonorable
failure to pay debts are usually brought under Article 133 for
"conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,"' 5 and not
under Article 134.11 This suggests that the officer's conduct, while
clearly in violation of Article 134, is being sanctioned due to his
10. See United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (CM 1952).
11. See United States v. Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 559, 20 C.M.R. 272, 275 (1955).
12. Id. In Kirksey, the court stated:
Moreover, members of the military community-easily identified through the
wearing of the uniform-are inevitably grouped in the public mind as a
class-with the result that a failure by one to discharge monetary responsibilities tends to brand all not only as criminal persons, but as poor credit risks as
well.
13. Id.
14. See Note, supra note 3; Everett, supra note 3, at 147.
15. UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. §933 (1970). Article 133 provides that "[ainy commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
The MANUAL, in discussing Article 133, lists several instances of violations of the Article.
In addition to dishonorable failure to pay debts, it mentions public association with
notorious prostitutes, committing or attempting to commit a crime involving moral turpitude, and opening and reading letters of another without authority. MANUAL 212.
Commissioned officers are defined as those persons vested with military rank and authority by virtue of a commission issued by or in the name of the President. See Army
Reg. 600-20 (April, 1971); L. CROCKER, THE OFFICER's GUIDE 15 (1975).
16. See, e.g., United States v. True, 10 C.M.R. 328 (CM 1953); United States v. Arnovits, 8 C.M.R. 313 (CM 1952), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 13 C.M.R. 94
(1953); United States v. Hansen, 8 C.M.R. 231 (CM 1953); United States v. Rehmann, 7
C.M.R. 172 (CM 1952); United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (CM 1952).
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status as an officer rather than simply because of his membership
in the military. This is not surprising; the conduct of officers has
traditionally been subject to stricter rules. 7 Operative leadership
is an essential element in a well-disciplined and combat-ready
military establishment. Effective leadership cannot be exercised
by those whose conduct may erode the respect of subordinates.
The greater part of the criticism directed at the military's
treatment of debt'" does not surround Article 133, however, for it
is not difficult to concur with the rationale regarding higher standards of conduct for officers. Most criticism is aimed at Article
134, particularly as applied to enlisted persons. Apparently, the
objectors do not expect the standard of conduct for enlisted members of the service to be any higher than that of their civilian
counterparts.' 9 However, the Supreme Court has justified the
application of higher standards of conduct to enlisted men, recognizing that the military is "a specialized society separate from
civilian society. 2 0 Moreover, military courts have noted that traditional military ethics, though particularly binding on officers,
"have not at all been rejected in . . .[the case of] . . .enlisted
personnel." 2 '
17. A high standard of conduct for officers has been well-documented back to the time
of the Norman Conquest. The influence of the British Articles of War on American military law is seen in the high standard of conduct of officers found today in the Code. See
J. SNEDEKER, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 887-89 (1953). For a brief outline
of the historical development of higher standards for officers and a discussion of the
possible vagueness of Article 133, see Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Officer: Ambiguity,
12 A.F. J.A.G. L. REV. 124-25 (1970).
18. See note 3 supra.
19. See Note, supra note 3.
20. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). In Parker, the Supreme Court related a
historical background for the General Article that is not much different than that of
Article 133. In justifying the existence of Article 134 and the Code in general as applicable
to all servicemen, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, said:
This Court has .. .recognized that the military has, again by necessity,
developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact that, "it is
the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars
should the occasion arise." (citation omitted).
Id. at 743.
21. United States v. Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 559, 20 C.M.R. 272, 275 (1955). Parenthetically, one should not forget that many enlisted persons serve in positions of leadership
and the rationale for Article 133 standards may also apply to them. Congress, however,
has never applied a separate standard of conduct to the noncommissioned officer, who
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While both Articles 133 and 134 of the Code evidence the military justice system's intention to deter and punish failure by
servicemen to honor their financial obligations, imprisonment of
every debtor who defaults does not occur. In fact, mere failure to
pay a debt is insufficient for conviction of dishonorable failure to
pay debts." In prosecutions for the offense, the key word is "dishonorable." 3 The military courts are adamant in requiring that
the debtor's actions indicate an intentional nonpayment or a
grossly indifferent attitude toward repayment. The requisite
mental element has been found 5 where the debtor's conduct was
characterized by fraud, deceit, evasion,27 false promises of payment, 8 or denial of indebtedness.29 For example, when a captain
purported to pay his debt to a lieutenant with checks issued on a
nonexistent bank30 and when a serviceman ran from taxicabs to
avoid paying fares, 3 the military courts held that their fraudulent
may be the immediate superior of dozens of military personnel. Noncommissioned officers
are those whose rank and authority result from promotion within the ranks of enlisted
military personnel rather than from a direct commission given by the President. Army
Reg. 600-20 (April, 1971).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Cummins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26 C.M.R. 449 (1958);
United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (CM 1952).
23. The offense of dishonorable failure to maintain sufficient funds for payment of
instruments is also prosecuted under Article 134. MANUAL
213f(9). The definition of
"dishonorable" for this offense is similar to that in dishonorable failure to pay debts.
Therefore, cases on sufficiency of funds will also be used to illustrate types of dishonorable
conduct.

24.

MANUAL

213f(7).

25. See, e.g., United States v. Milam, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 413, 30 C.M.R. 413 (1961); United
States v. Brand, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 28 C.M.R. 3 (1959); United States v. Downard, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 538, 20 C.M.R. 254 (1955); United States v. Robinson, 16 C.M.R. 766 (ACM
1954); United States v. Rehmann, 7 C.M.R. 172 (CM 1952).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Cummins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26 C.M.R. 449 (1958);
United States v. Blount, 5 C.M.R. 297 (CM 1952).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 8 C.M.R. 231 (CM 1952); United States v.
Maxwell, 7 C.M.R. 632 (ACM 1952).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Neville, 7 C.M.R. 180 (CM 1952); United States v.
Rehmann, 7 C.M.R. 172 (CM 1952); United States v. St. Ours, 6 C.M.R. 178 (CM 1952);
United States v. Blount, 5 C.M.R. 297 (CM 1952).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 27 C.M.R. 134 (1958).
30. United States v. True, 10 C.M.R. 328 (CM 1953).
31. United States v. DeLancey, 34 C.M.R. 845 (ACM 1964). DeLancey's appeal was
based, in part, on the fact that the cab drivers had never made a demand on the debt
and therefore dishonor was not proved. While demand is a factor usually considered in
such cases, the court concluded:
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and deceitful conduct indicated an intentional nonpayment.
Gross indifference and bad faith were found where a solvent
debtor ignored the counsel of his commanding officer to pay his
debts.3" In addition, failure to comunicate with creditors who had
sent the accused several letters was held to be evidence of gross
indifference. 3
A military debtor whose actions do not indicate the requisite
mental element cannot be court-martialed." Negligent failure to
pay debts is not sufficient, even if the conduct is discrediting to
the service. 5 In determining the guilt of the accused, the military
courts are sensitive to good faith efforts of the serviceman. For
example, when a serviceman attempted to make arrangements to
pay his debts" or honestly believed he had the money to cover his
checks,37 the courts have reversed convictions for dishonorable
conduct. 8 In addition, if the creditor was satisfied with the
The law does not require the doing of a useless act. After an accused, as in
this case, has made it plain that his purpose was to defraud the taxicab drivers
of their fares, there existed no additional requirement for them to make useless
demands for payment and then wait a specified period of time.
Id. at 848.
32. See United States v. Bonar, 40 C.M.R. 482 (CM 1969).
33. United States v. Swanson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 711, 25 C.M.R. 832 (1958); United States
v. Hansen, 8 C.M.R. 231 (CM 1953).
34. Instructions given to the members of the court-martial ,will be held insufficient
unless they require the members to find dishonorable conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
McArdle, 27 C.M.R. 1006 (ACM 1959); United States v. Jones, 5 C.M.R. 797 (ACM 1952);
United States v. Friend, 5 C.M.R. 638 (ACM 1952).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 20 C.M.R. 254 (1955)
(overruled an earlier Army Board of Review decision, United States v. Boyles, 10 C.M.R.
446 (1953), where the lesser offense of wrongfully and discreditably failing to pay a debt
was held a crime under Article 134); United States v. Lenton, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 690, 25
C.M.R. 194 (1958); MANUAL 213f(7).
36. United States v. Schneiderman, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 494, 31 C.M.R. 80 (1961); United
States v. Stevenson, 30 C.M.R. 769 (ACM 1960); United States v. Lucas, 19 C.M.R. 558
(NCM 1955).
37. United States v. Richardson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 35 C.M.R. 372 (1965) (held that
accused could honestly rely on checks which were proceeds of a gambling game and he
therefore lacked the intent necessary for the offense); United States v. Remele, 13
U.S.C.M.A. 617, 33 C.M.R. 149 (1963) (held that accused's reliance on deposit allegedly
made by another negated the intent required for offense).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Milam, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 413, 30 C.M.R. 413 (1961); United
States v. Brand, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 28 C.M.R. 3 (1959); United States v. Rothman, 30
C.M.R. 872 (ACM 1960); United States v. Young, 12 C.M.R. 939 (ACM 1953); United
States v. Arnovits, 8 C.M.R. 313 (CM 1952).
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if the failure to pay was beyond the debtor's

control,4 °

the charge usually failed. If there is a defense to the
creditor's claim or if there is a genuine dispute between the parties, the offense will not be charged. 4'
It should be emphasized that the military charge of
dishonorable failure to pay debts is different from a civil suit
brought by a creditor seeking a judgment. The court-martial is a
criminal action in which the United States seeks to protect the
image and status of the armed forces and its personnel. Therefore,
the debtor in uniform does not necessarily carry the key which
unlocks the prison door in his own pocket, as he usually does in
the civilian sector. Paying the debt after one has committed dishonorable conduct is of little or no consequence,42 except, perhaps, for purposes of extenuation and mitigation in the presentencing hearing. Imprisonment for dishonorable failure to pay
debts is punishment for dishonorable conduct and a present obligation to repay is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for conviction of the offense.
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS

To put the military practice into perspective, it should be
pointed out that neither the federal constitution nor the majority
of state constitutions contain blanket prohibitions of imprisonment for debt.43 In many jurisdictions, civilians can be jailed by
state court order for actions involving mismanagement of their
39. See, e.g., United States v. Cummins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26 C.M.R. 449 (1958);
United States v. Rusterholz, 39 C.M.R. 903 (ACM 1968).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 8 C.M.R. 231 (CM 1952); United States v.
Maxwell, 7 C.M.R. 632 (CM 1952). For example, a serviceman between transfers may
have his pay record lost or misplaced by those in charge of forwarding it to his next
command. This may result in no pay for several pay periods. In such a circumstance, the
failure to pay his debts would obviously be beyond the control of the debtor.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Pettingill, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 45 C.M.R. 183 (1972);
United States v. Webb, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 422, 27 C.M.R. 496 (1959). See MANUAL 213f(7).
42. See, e.g., United States v. True, 10 C.M.R. 328, 332 (1953); United States v. Maxwell, 7 C.M.R. 632 (ACM 1952); United States v. Neville, 7 C.M.R. 180 (CM 1952).
43. Imprisonment for debt is completely prohibited by constitution in the following
states: ALA. CONST. art. I, §20; ALAS. CONST. art. I, §17; CAL. CONST. art. I, §10; GA. CONST.
art. I, §2-12; HAWAII CONST. art. I, §17; Miss. CONST. art. III, §30; Mo. CONST. art. III,
§38; N.M. CONST. art. II, §21; TENN. CONST. art. I, §18; TEX. CONST. art. I, §18.
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debts. Most often, these jurisdictions authorize body execution,
i.e., imprisonment, when the debtor is guilty of fraudulent conduct.44
The state of Illinois, for example, has constitutional and statutory provisions not unlike those found in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. The Illinois Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt except when the debtor ".
his estate for the benefit of his creditors

.
.

. refuses to deliver up
. . or unless there is a

strong presumption of fraud." 45 The enumerated exceptions to the
general prohibition against imprisonment for debt are comparable to the types of conduct characterized as dishonorable within
military jurisprudence.
Using the constitutional guidelines as a pattern, the Illinois
legislature enacted a statute authorizing body execution of a
judgment debtor, resulting in imprisonment for a maximum of six
months," if ".

.

. the debtor has fraudulently conveyed, con-

44. The following state constitutions prohibit imprisonment for debt except in certain
cases. The most common exception is for fraud. The corresponding statutes authorize
body execution in such circumstances as when the judgment debtor has been fraudulent
in incurring the debt, has concealed or refused to deliver up his estate, has received
money in a fiduciary capacity, has been found guilty of a malicious tort, or may abscond
from the state. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §18; ARIz. REV. STAT. §12-1563 (1956); ARK. CONST.
art. II, §16; COLO. CONST. art. IT, §12; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-59-103 (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. ch. 52, §§369, 355, 562 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§5051-52 (1974);
FLA. CONST. art. I, §11; IDAHO CONST. art. I, §15; IDAHO CODE §§11-102, -104 (1947);
I.L.. CONST. art. I, §14; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §§5, 65 (1975); IND. CONST. art. I, §22; IND.
ANN. STAT. tit. 34, §§1-41-10 to 15 (1971); IOWA CONST. art. I, §19; KAN. CONST. BILL OF
RICHTS, §16; Ky. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, §18; Ky. REV. STAT. §§425.070, 426.400 (1962);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 224, §§2 et seq. (1958); MICH. CONST. art. I, §21; MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. §600.675 (1961); MINN. CONST. art. I, §12; Mo. CONST. art. I, §11; MONT. CONST.
art. II, §27; NEB. CONST. art. I, §20; NEB. REV. STAT. §25-1566 (1943); NEV. CONST. art. I,
§14; NEV. REV. STAT. §§21.020, 21.080 (1973); N.J. CONST. art. I, §13; N.J. REV. STAT. tit.
2A, §§15-42, 54-4(3) (1951); N.C. CONST. art. I, §28; N.C. GEN. STATS. §§1-311, 1-410, 1415 (1969); N.D. CONST. art. I, §15; OHIO CONST. art. I, §15; OHIO REV. CODE tit. 23,
§§2331.01, 2331.02 (1953); OKLA. CONST. art. II, §12; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §844 (1951); ORE.
CONST. art. I, §19; ORE. REV. STAT. §23.080 (1974); PA. CONST. art. I, §16; R.I. CONST. art.
1, §11; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §9-25-15 (1956); S.C. CONST. art. I, §19; S.C. CODE ANN. §§10802, 10-1705, 17-574 (1962); S.C. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§15-18-9, 10-20-5, 22-2 (1967);
UTAH CONST. art. I, §16; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§3521, 3522, 3529 (1957); WASH. CONST.
art. I, §17; WYO, CONST. art. I, §5. But see Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§1-651, 1-705 (1957).
45. ILL. CONST. art. I, §14.

46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §§65, 68 (1975). Illinois also allows body execution for a tort

1976]

MILITARY DEBTORS

cealed, or otherwise disposed of some part of his estate, with a
design to secure the same to his own use, or defraud his creditors
.
. ,"I Thus the familiar terms "fraud," "conceal," and "defraud," which are used to define "dishonorable" in the military,
also appear in a civilian statute.
Conduct similar to the dishonorable debt-related actions punished by the military also works to the disadvantage of debtors
in the United States Bankruptcy Court. The Federal Bankruptcy
Act4" offers a discharge of debts to those who have acted honestly
and in good faith in managing their financial affairs. Conversely,
the privilege of discharge is denied to debtors whose actions reflect dishonesty or bad faith. Section 14c of the Bankruptcy Act49
authorizes the court to refuse discharge for certain types of conduct. For example, if a bankrupt transfers or conceals assets to
defraud creditors, tampers with his financial records, makes false
oaths or claims, or obtains credit with a false financial statement,
none of his debts will be discharged.
In addition, individual debts may be excluded from the general
judgment when there has been a finding of malice and the defendant refuses to deliver
up his estate. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §5 (1975). The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld
the constitutionality of section 5 in Lipman v. Goebel, 357 11. 305, 192 N.E. 203, cert. denied, 294 U.S. 712 (1934). See also ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS §2.76 (rev. ed. 1974).
47. I.L. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §65 (1975). In Huntington v. Metzger, 158 Ill. 272, 41 N.E.
881 (1895), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the grounds for body execution in the
statute "are within the contemplation of the constitution." The provision regarding body
execution in the present Illinois Constitution is identical to the provision which the court
examined in Huntington.
48. 11 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. (1970).
49. Id. §32(c). Section 14(c) provides:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has (1)
committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided under title 18,
United States Code, section 152; or (2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to keep or preserve books of account or records, from which his
financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained . . . or (3)
while engaged in business, obtained for such business money or property on
credit or as an extension or renewal of credit by making or publishing or causing
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever a materially false statement
in writing respecting his financial condition or the financial condition of such
partnership or corporation; or (4) . . . transferred, removed, destroyed, or
concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his
property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; or . . . (7) has
failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet
his liabilities . ...
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discharge under section 17 of the Act. Liabilities obtained by false
pretenses or representations, incurred for willful or malicious injuries to person or property, or created by fraud of an officer or
fiduciary, can be challenged by the creditor and denied discharge. 50
While the Federal Bankruptcy Act's primary purpose is not to
be a federal ban against imprisonment of debtors, 5 it does protect
a bankrupt from civil arrest and possible confinement based on
a claim discharged in bankruptcy. Conversely, if a debtor is denied discharge he may be sued in a state court for the debt and
then imprisoned under a body execution statute.2 Whether discharged or not, a misbehaving debtor is also subject to prosecution and imprisonment under federal and state criminal statutes
prohibiting the fraudulent conduct described in the Bankruptcy
3
Act .
Since a civilian debtor may be imprisoned for fraudulent conduct in connection with his debts under both state and federal
law, it is only logical that a serviceman, held to a higher standard
of conduct than a civilian, should also be liable for dishonorable
actions in managing his debts. The current practice of imprisonment of military debtors is not an anomaly in American jurisprudence, but a commonly prescribed method for dealing with
fraudulent debtors.
INTERACTION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS

A member of the armed forces is subject to both the military
and the civilian courts, and within the civilian system, is liable
to both civil and criminal complaints. Therefore, the military
justice system has attempted to protect the military debtor from
multiple liability by determining the boundaries between the systems and the impact of a judgment in one court on litigation in
the other. Statutes, military policy, and judicial decisions have
50. Id. §356.
51. Section 9 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §27 (1970), protects a bankrupt from
civil process based on a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy. However, a claim is not
dischargeable if it is based on fraud or other reprehensible conduct. Id. §356.
52. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
53. 11 U.S.C. §§32(c), 356 (1970).
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attempted to clarify the areas of confusion so that the military
debtor is tried within a rational and equitable framework.
When a creditor seeks his remedy against a military debtor in
a civilian court, his recourse is limited by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 4 which protects uniformed citizens from
civil .actions based on debts incurred prior to entry into the
military. Civilian courts are given discretion to stay proceedings
and executions where military status hampers the serviceman in
defending or satisfying his previous debts. The rationale is simple. One could hardly expect a creditor to be able to sue the
serviceman who earned $15,000 a year as a steelworker before
enlisting or being drafted into the service of his country and who
now receives less than one-half of his former salary. However, the
Act does not grant indefinite delay of payment of all debts.
Rather, courts will seek dispositions equitable to all parties involved.15
In addition, the creditor of a serviceman cannot be given satisfaction in a military court. The military can prosecute for dishonorable conduct in a criminal action, but has no authority to issue
a money judgment or enforce a civil judgment issued by a court
of another jurisdiction." However, when a serviceman's debts
54. 50 U.S.C. App. §§501-90 (1970). A detailed discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act is not appropriate here, but a limited listing of its protections is warranted.
"[O]bligations secured by mortgage, trust deed, or other security in the nature of a
mortgage upon real or personal property" owned by the serviceman prior to entering the
military cannot be treated as defaulted unless, in the discretion of a judge, the military
member could continue to make payments without undue hardship. Id. §532. The Act also
provides for deferring non-federal taxes, id. §§525, 527, repaying loans on life insurance
policies, id. §535, staying the execution and levy of judgment creditors, id. §523, and
prohibiting repossession of real or personal property contracted for before entering military
service, id. §531. See Goldman, Collection of Debts Incurred by Military Personnel: The
Creditor's View, 10 TULSA L.J. 537 (1975).
55. As military pay scales increase, the use of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
may decrease.
56. Army Reg. 600-15, paras. 1-3 (Feb. 11, 1970). The Army Regulation is perhaps the
most detailed of all the services' regulations. Paragraphs 1-3 explain the policy of the
service:
1-3. Policy. a. As [sic] member of the Armed Forces is expected to pay his
just financial obligations in a proper and timely manner. A "just financial
obligation" means one acknowledged by the military member in which there is
no reasonable dispute as to the facts or the law, or one reduced to judgment
which conforms to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act ... if applicable.
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have been litigated to his advantage before a civil tribunal, he
may still be court-martialed for his dishonorable conduct regarding his debts. This raises the issue of what effect, if any, the
civilian judgment will have on the court-martial.
The Military Court of Appeals resolved the question in United
States v. Swanson.5" In that case, a lieutenant being courtmartialed for dishonorable failure to pay debts asserted that a
prior bankruptcy judgment was res judicata as to the issue of
dishonorable conduct. Pursuant to a voluntary bankruptcy
petition, the accused had previously been awarded a discharge
which included the debts specified in the charges at the courtmartial. The lieutenant argued that the bankruptcy proceeding
had settled the issue of fraud and other dishonorable acts, since
the discharge had determined that the dishonest conduct of section 14c of the Bankruptcy Act was not present,58 or at least; not
proven, with respect to the debts discharged. Since conduct of a
dishonorable nature was absent, the accused asserted that there
could be no court-martial conviction.
The court rejected the res judicata defense, distinguishing the
issues involved in each suit.5" The bankruptcy discharge settled
only the issue of the legal obligation to pay; the court-martial was
concerned with the discreditable conduct of the accused. The
court stressed that a bankruptcy discharge could not bar prosecution for a criminal offense committed prior to filing of the bank"In a proper and timely manner" means a manner which the installation commander concerned determines does not, under the circumstances, reflect discredit on the military service.
b. The Department of the Army does not condone an attitude of irresponsibility or evasiveness by its personnel toward their just private indebtedness or
financial obligations. However, the Department of the Army has no legal authority to require a military member to pay a private debt, or to divert any part of
his pay for the satisfaction thereof even though the indebtedness may have been
reduced to judgment by a civil court. The enforcement of the private obligations
of a military member is a matter for civil authorities.
57. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 711, 26 C.M.R. 491 (1958), aff'g 25 C.M.R. 832 (ACM 1957).
58. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
59. The Air Force Board of Review decision pointed out that the parties to the military
action differed from those in the bankruptcy action. The parties to the bankruptcy proceeding were the accused and his creditors; the parties to the court-martial were the
accused and the government. 25 C.M.R. 832, 840 (ACM 1958). In some circumstances it
is possible for the government to be a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding. In such a case,
a res judicata argument in a subsequent court-martial might be stronger.
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ruptcy petition. Since the discreditable conduct of the accused
took place prior to the petition, the court concluded that the
court-martial was not barred by the bankruptcy action and the
military court was not bound by the bankruptcy court's decision.
While a serviceman is not protected from court-martial for dishonorable failure to pay a debt already discharged in bankruptcy,
he is generally protected from court-martial when he has been
tried in civilian court for criminal conduct which comprises the
military offense. Theoretically, military personnel may be tried
in both state and federal court for the same crimes under the
theory of dual sovereignty.'" Thus, military personnel could be
tried for fraud under state law and subsequently be courtmartialed for dishonorable failure to pay debts under Article
134.1 However, the military follows a policy against federal retrial
following a state prosecution" and, therefore, a serviceman will
usually not be court-martialed after a civilian criminal trial.
In certain circumstances, a military court may have no jurisdiction over a serviceman accused of criminal conduct, even
though he has violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In
63 the United States Supreme Court held
O'Callahanv. Parker,
that the accused's military status alone was insufficient to authorize court-martial jurisdiction. The offense charged had to
have some service connection. Since the accused, wearing civilian
attire, committed the alleged offense off-base in a civilian hotel,
against a non-military victim, his offense had no connection with
the service. Therefore, his conviction for attempted rape was reversed because his court-martial lacked jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's rationale for imposing the serviceconnection requirement was their concern for the fifth amendment rights of the accused. Since a serviceman is not given his
rights to indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury at a
court-martial, the Court preferred that he be tried, if possible, in
a civilian court where his constitutional rights would be honored.
60. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).

61. See

MANUAL

215b; H.

MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY

§2-734 (1972); United

States v. Rosenblatt, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 32 C.M.R. 28 (1962).

62. See

MANUAL

215b; H.

MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY

Army Reg. 27-10, para. 6-12 (Nov. 26, 1968).
63. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).

§2-734 (1972). See, e.g.,
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In view of O'Callahan,court-martial jurisdiction for dishonorable failure to pay debts may be a problem where the offense
involves a serviceman's debts in the civilian community." Where
there is no evidence of a connection between the accused and the
military during the transaction, it is difficult to find a service
connection.85 However, when a serviceman uses his military status to induce a civilian into extending credit or accepting checks,
the courts have found a sufficient service connection for courtmartial jurisdiction."
More importantly, several courts have waived the serviceconnection requirement in cases where the serviceman would not
be accorded his fifth amendment rights even if given a civilian
trial. These courts have focused on the rationale used by the
Supreme Court in establishing the requirement, and have concluded that O'Callahanapplies only when the accused's rights to
indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury are threatened. 7 For example, in United States v. EzeIle, the accused was
charged with issuing worthless checks and dishonorable failure to
pay debt. The Court of Military Appeals held that the courtmartial was without jurisdiction as to the worthless check charge
because the offenses involved civilian victims unconnected with
the service, the crimes were not committed on a military post,
and the civilian courts were open to handle the matter. The court
reached a different conclusion on the charge of dishonorable failure to pay debts. 9 The court reasoned that since the accused's
64. In Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), affg 409 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1969),
a habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant committed a crime on base against a person
who worked on the base. The Court found this offense to be sufficiently service-connected.
It would follow that debts incurred by a serviceman in on-base facilities would present no
jurisdictional problems.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Haagenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 332, 41 C.M.R. 332 (1970).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Fryman, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 41 C.M.R. 71 (1970); United
States v. Hallaghan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 41 C.M.R. 46 (1969); United States v. Peak, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 22, 41 C.M.R. 22 (1969); United States v. Morisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 41
C.M.R. 17 (1969); United States v. McCarthy, 46 C.M.R. 559 (CM 1972).
67. See Bell v. Clark, 308 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.
1971); Moylan v. Haird, 305 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969); United States v. Bowers, 47
C.M.R. 516 (ACM 1973). For an argument contra that court-martial jurisdiction should
be analyzed from a "classic" rather than a "functional" viewpoint see Note, supra note
3, at 1694.
68. 41 C.M.R. 904 (ACM 1969).
69. Id.at 905-06.
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failure to pay his debt to a car rental agency was not criminally
punishable under the state laws, invoking court-martial jurisdiction did not deprive the accused of the benefits of a civilian criminal trial. 0
This reading of O'Callahanproperly balances the interests of
the accused with those of the military. Where the accused could
be afforded constitutional protections in a civilian jurisdiction, he
is not court-martialed. However, where no constitutional rights
are endangered, the military is allowed to exercise its jurisdiction
for the purpose of controlling the conduct of its members and
preserving discipline and order.
ACTUAL TREATMENT OF THE MILITARY DEBTOR

Although the judicial framework for handling military debtors
exists, the actual frequency of courts-martial for the offense of
dishonorable failure to pay debts is small. More often, the military resorts to the nonjudicial alternatives suggested by the Code
and the regulations governing each of the military services.
The serviceman-debtor is not a helpless victim of an indifferent
military institution. Generally, the military debtor is afforded
protection and assistance not available to the civilian." In addition to the protections of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act," the procedures for handling creditors' complaints received
by the military are oriented toward assisting the debtor in
straightening out his financial affairs, not coercing the debtor to
pay unfair claims. The regulations for the armed services emphasize that the military is not a collection agency." For example,
the military has no authority to garnish a serviceman's wages,
except for alimony and child support payments. 4
70. The same reasoning was evident in United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26,
41 C.M.R. 26 (1969), in which the court held that a court-martial may take jurisdiction
over a nonservice-connected action where the offense charged in the civilian jurisdiction
is minor. Since a defendant accused of a petty offense is not entitled to indictment or trial
by jury, he loses no constitutional rights by being subjected to a military trial.
71. See Butler, Stuart, Wolen, & Herron, Indebtedness and the Serviceman, 10 A.F.
J.A.G. L. RRv. 25 (1968).
72. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
73. See note 56 supra.
74. 42 U.S.C. §659 (Supp. 1976).
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Each of the services has regulations which must be used as
guidelines by commanding officers.75 Initially, the military seeks
to prevent servicemen's accumulation of debt by compelling the
commanding officer to instruct his personnel regarding the pitfalls of easy credit. The regulations also outline procedures to be
used in responding to letters of indebtedness from creditors and
dealing with the respective debtors.
Commanders are instructed that a letter of indebtedness from
the creditor of a subordinate must meet certain requirements.
Creditors must submit, in addition to their claims, certificates
evidencing compliance with standards of fairness and/or full disclosure requirements," including the Truth in Lending Act" and
the Consumer Credit Protection Act.7" No disciplinary action will
be taken against the alleged debtor if the claim is not accompanied by a certificate of compliance.
If the claim is determined to be valid, or if there has been a
judgment which is not countered with a conflicting decree, the
commander must counsel the debtor7" regarding the offense of
dishonorable failure to pay debts and refer him to a judge advocate for expert assistance. 0 The regulations further provide:
If, after consideration of all factors, a commanding officer believes that a member of his command has dishonorably failed
to pay his just debts, disciplinary action may be initiated.8 '
75. See Air Force Reg. 35-18c (Feb. 22, 1974); Army Reg. 600.15 (Feb. 11, 1970); Marine
Corps Order P5800.8, ch. 6 (Aug. 17, 1970); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 6210140
(Nov. 21, 1975).
76. See Air Force Reg. 35-18, §B paras. 4(a)-(b) (Feb. 22, 1974); Army Reg. 600-15,
paras. 2-2(d) (Feb. 11, 1970); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 6210140, ch. 6 paras.
5(a)-(d) (Nov. 21, 1975).
77. 15 U.S.C. §§1601-13, 1631-41, 1661-65, 1671-77, 1681-81t (1970); 18 U.S.C. §89196 (1970).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§1601-13, 1631-41, 1642-44, 1671-77 (1970).
79. See Air Force Reg. 35-18, §A para. 1(b), §B para. 2(b) (Feb. 22, 1974); Army Reg.
600-15, para. 3(1)(c)(2) (Feb. 11, 1970); Army Reg. 600-14 (Sept. 30, 1965); Marine Corps
Order P5800.8, paras. 6001-(I-B), (9), (10) (Aug. 17, 1970); Bureau of Naval Personnel
Manual, 6210140, ch. 6 para. 12(b) (Nov. 21, 1975).
80. See Air Force Reg. 35-18, §B para. 5(b)(2)(b) (Feb. 22, 1974); Army Reg. 600-14,
para. 4(4) (Sept. 30, 1965); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 6210140, ch. 6 para. 3(j)
(Nov. 21, 1975).
81. See Air Force Reg. 35-18, §D para. 11 (Feb. 22, 1974); Army Reg. 600-15, para.

3(1)(b) (Feb. 11, 1970); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 6210140, ch. 6 para. 3(5) (Nov.
21, 1975); MANUAL 127c.
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Obviously, judicial action may be taken against those who dishonorably fail to pay their debts. However, nonjudicial forms of
punishment for minor offenses are also available; they are prescribed in Article 15 of the Code."2 Its, application is generally
limited to offenses which, if tried by general court-martial, could
not be punishd by dishonorable discharge or confinement for
more than one year.83 Since the Manual of Courts-MartialTable
of Maximum Punishment" allows a bad conduct discharge and
only six months confinement for those convicted of dishonorable
failure to pay debts, it is permissible to use Article 15 for lesser
violations of this nature. The Army regulation, in fact, suggests
the use of this article in punishing a. soldier for dishonorable
failure to pay debts."5 In any case, nonjudicial punishment cannot
be awarded until the debt's validity has been established, for
Article 15, while not judicial, is certainly disciplinary. Punishments which can be imposed under Article 15 include extra
duties, restriction, correctional custody, forfeiture or detention of
pay, and reduction in grade."6
The existence of valid, unpaid debts is detrimental to the career service member even though no judicial or nonjudicial action
is taken. All of the regulations provide for the inclusion in official
service records of letters of indebtedness found to be in compliance with the various statutes. 7 Those records are reviewed for
promotion and assignment purposes, and a bad faith debtor will
certainly suffer for his misconduct. In addition, fitness reports
82. UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. §815 (1970). Punishment authorized by this article is also
called "office hours," "captain's mast," or "an Article 15." An Article 15 sanction bans a
later court-martial for a minor offense. See MANUAL 215c; MOYER, supra note 61 at §2733.
83. MANUAL 129b.
Generally, the term "minor" includes misconduct not involving any greater
degree of criminality than is involved in the average offense tried by summary
court-martial. This term ordinarily does not include misconduct of a kind
which, if tried by general court-martial, could be punished by dishonorable
discharge or confinement for more than one year.
MANUAL 11128b.
84. Id. at 127c.
85. See Army Reg. 600-15, para. 3(1)(b) (Feb. 11, 1970).
86. UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. §815 (1970).
87. Air Force Reg. 35-18, paras. l(b) and 11 (Feb. 22, 1974); Army Reg. 600-15, para.
3(1)(b) (Feb. 11, 1970); Marine Corps Order P5800.8, para. 6001.4, 6001.5 (Aug. 17, 1970);
Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 6210140, para. 12 (Nov. 21, 1975).
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and efficiency reports of senior enlisted personnel and officers,
and proficiency and conduct marks of junior enlisted members
will be marred since the senior officer making the report takes
into consideration recently received valid letters of indebted88
ness.
Empirical evidence indicates that military officials display
genuine concern for servicemen confronted with financial difficulties. The predominate form of assistance to these servicemen includes inspection of creditor allegations of indebtedness and a
preference for imposition of nonjudicial, nonpunitive measures
when those allegations are substantiated. A survey of several officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander and above 9
revealed that each carefully scrutinized letters of indebtedness,
especially those from "easy credit" clothing and jewelry establishments near the front gates of military bases. Each of the
responding officers also contacted the legal officer to ensure the
validity of each claim, many of which were found to be invalid.
There was only one report of an Article 15 having been imposed.
In that case the debtor was restricted to his ship as it visited
various ports. The purpose of the sentence was to prevent the
sailor from spending the money on shore that he should have been
using to pay his valid debts.
Research into the records of the Air Force, Army, and Navy for
the years 1970 through 19760 yielded the parallel conclusion that
few servicemen are ever court-martialed for dishonorable failure
to pay debt when they fail to repay their financial obligations.
However, the data from the Army and the Navy" are not completely adequate for research purposes because records at department level are kept only for more serious offenses which are tried
88. Particularly in the case of fitness reports and efficiency reports, senior officers
reporting on subordinates are asked to mark such characteristics as trustworthiness and
the conduct of one's personal affairs.
89. Interviews were conducted with the following officers: Commander T. E. Davis,
U.S. Naval Reserve, Forest Park, Illinois, July 15, 1975; Colonel Marion Markey, U.S.
Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), Chicago, Illinois, July 15, 1975; Commander J. Pape,
U.S. Navy, Chicago, Illinois, July 14, 1975; Colonel A. H. Manhard, Jr., U.S. Marine
Corps, Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois, July 12, 1975.
90. The author is grateful to those individuals in each of the military service departments who responded promptly to a request for statistical data.
91. Statistics from the Department of the Navy include records of the Marine Corps.

19761

MILITARY DEBTORS

at general or bad conduct discharge special courts-martial."
The Air Force records since July 1, 1974, include lesser courtsmartial and Article 15 nonjudicial proceedings. Therefore, Air
Force statistics will be used to determine the frequency of punishment for dishonorable failure to pay debts. The Air Force statistics should be fairly representative of the services in light of the
fact that all use the same Code and Manual.
In the Air Force, during the period from January 1, 1970,
through January 1976,11 there were no general or bad conduct
discharge special courts-martial based solely on a charge of dishonorable failure to pay debt.94 Since July 1, 1974, through the
end of the period, statistics of lesser courts-martial9 5 and Article
15 nonjudicial proceedings were recorded at the department level.
During that time, there were no lesser courts-martial in which
dishonorable failure to pay debt was the only offense charged."0
92. There are three basic types of courts-martial: general, special, and summary. The
seriousness of the offense or offenses charged determines the type of court-martial which
the individual will receive. A general court-martial, which usually can only be convened
by a flag or general officer in command, may adjudge any punishment found in the Table
of Maximum Punishments. MANUAL 5a, 127c. A special court-martial may be convened
by mid-level commanding officers and cannot award punishment greater than a bad
conduct discharge, six months confinement, and two-thirds forfeiture of pay for six
months. Id. 5b, 15b. A summary court-martial, in essence a one-officer hearing, is also
convened by mid-level commanding officers, but the degree of punishment is limited. Id.
5c. There can be no discharge, confinement is limited to 30 days, and two-thirds forfeiture of pay may be imposed for only one month. Id. 16b. Officers and those in training
to become officers may not be tried by a summary court-martial. Id. 16a. In addition,
anyone referred to a summary court-martial may refuse one, demanding to be heard before
a special court-martial. Id. 16a.
93. Letter from Walter L. Lewis, Colonel, United States Air Force, Chief, Military
Justice Division, to C.H. Morrison, Jr., Mar. 30, 1976, updating letter from Walter L.
Lewis, Colonel, United States Air Force, Chief, Military Justice Division, to C.H. Morrison, Jr., July 8, 1975. This information was obtained from the Automated Military Justice
Analysis and Management System. This fully automated data system is used by the Judge
Advocate General's Department, USAF, to collect statistics on courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment.
94. During the period from June, 1975, through January, 1976, two enlisted men were
tried by general court-martial and given bad conduct discharges for multiple offenses
which included dishonorable failure to pay debts. However, the gravity of the other offenses charged indicates that the discharge was punishment for the more serious offenses, not
the dishonorable failure to pay debt.
95. Lesser offenses may be tried by non-bad conduct discharge special court-martial or
summary court-martial. During the period examined, there were 1,823 non-bad conduct
discharge special courts-martial and 112 summary courts-martial.
96. The Air Force reports only one non-bad conduct special court-martial in which
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There were, however, 49 Article 15 proceedings. These resulted in
43 reductions in grade, 39 of which were suspended; 14 forfeitures
in pay, 11 of which were suspended; and 11 restrictions to quart7
ers or extra duty.9
The economic state of the nation since July 1, 1974, has been
especially conducive to the excess accumulation of debt. During
this period an increase in the number of dishonorable debtors
could be expected. The statistics, however, show that no such
trend is developing. 8 In fact, the preceding data indicate that few
military persons are imprisoned for dishonorable failure to pay
debts. Indeed, few are court-martialed or otherwise disciplined in
any manner.
dishonorable failure to pay debts was one of several charges. The serviceman tried was
sentenced to two months confinement.
97. Some airmen received more than one punishment. For this reason the punishments
add up to more than 49.
98. In the Army, only general and bad conduct discharge special courts-martial are
recorded at the department level. During the period from January 1, 1970, to March 1,
1976, five officers and fourteen enlisted members were tried for the crime of dishonorable
failure to pay debts in addition to other offenses. Four of the five officers were convicted
and dismissed from the service. One of those convicted was also awarded a partial forfeiture of pay and 18 months confinement at hard labor. Since the Table of Punishment only
authorizes six months confinement for conviction of dishonorable failure to pay debts, it
must be assumed that a good portion of the sentence was for the other joined offenses.
Of the 14 enlisted personnel tried, nine convictions resulted. All the sentences called
for a bad conduct discharge, partial or total forfeiture of pay, and reduction in grade
(unless already at the lowest grade when tried). Eight of the nine courts-martial awarded
confinement at hard labor for periods ranging from three months to five years. Again,
much of this confinement was obviously the result of the other charges. The Court of
Military Appeals dismissed one of the convictions and is presently considering two more.
Another two soldiers had their sentences reduced on review. One review proceeding was
abated because of the death of the convicted defendant. Letter from James D. Kemper,
Jr., Clerk of Court, United States Army Judiciary, Falls Church, Virginia, to C.H.
Morrison, Jr., Mar. 11, 1976.
The Department of the Navy, like the Army, only has records at the headquarters level
of general and bad conduct discharge special courts-martial. From January, 1970, to
March 1, 1976, the Navy has tried only two individuals for the dishonorable failure to pay
debt. Both were enlisted men, one a sailor and the other a Marine. Sentencing information
on these cases is not available. Letter from Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General
(Military Justice), Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., to C.H. Morrison, Jr.,
July 7, 1975; interview with Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (Military Justice),
Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., Mar. 10, 1976.
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CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the armed forces' need for respected leadership and for high public regard of the military service and its
personnel requires prohibition of conduct which brings dishonor
or discredit to the uniformed ranks. Thus, the military brig is not
a debtors' prison in the traditional sense of that phrase. It does,
however, periodically confine those who exhibit dishonorable conduct in the management of their just debts. While this conduct
may not be punishable in all civilian jurisdictions, some states,
and the federal government through the Bankruptcy Act, afford
no more protection for the dishonest debtor than do the Code and
Manual. In fact, the military justice system's prohibition of dishonorable failure to pay debts is tempered by regulations which
not only encourage expert assistance to the financially troubled
serviceman, but also protect him from the unscrupulous creditor.
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